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Hybrid Pricing in a Coupled European Power Market with More Wind Power 
Endre Bjørndal§, Mette Bjørndal§, Hong Cai§‡, Evangelos Panos†  
 
Abstract: In the European market, the promotion of wind power leads to more network congestion. 
Zonal pricing (market coupling), which does not take the physical characteristics of transmission 
into account, is the most commonly used method to relieve congestion in Europe. Zonal pricing 
fails to provide adequate locational price signals regarding the energy resource scarcity and thus 
creates a large amount of unscheduled cross-border flows originating from wind-generated power, 
making the interconnected grid less secure. Prior studies show that full nodal pricing works better 
in integrating wind power into the grid. In this paper we investigate the effects of applying a hybrid 
congestion management model, i.e. nodal pricing model for one country embedded in a zonal 
pricing system for the rest of the market. We test how nodal pricing works in such a hybrid context 
with more wind power. We find that, compared to full nodal pricing, hybrid pricing fails to fully 
utilize all the resources in the network and some wrong price signals might be given. However, 
hybrid pricing still performs better than zonal pricing. The results from the hybrid pricing model 
of Poland, Germany, Slovakia and the Czech Republic show that, within the area applying nodal 
pricing (Poland), better price signals are given; the need for re-dispatching reduces; more 
congestion rent is collected and the unit cost of power is reduced. The results also show that 
international power exchange increases between the nodal pricing area and the zonal pricing 
areas, especially on windy days. Moreover, the nodal pricing area has less unscheduled cross-
border power flow from the zonal pricing area entering its network and collects more cross-border 
congestion rent.  
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1. Introduction 
The efforts to meet the renewable energy target of the Renewable Energy Directive 2009/28/EC 
have led to a large number of wind capacity installations in the EU countries. Promotion of 
renewable energy sources has challenged the current power systems. As wind power requires high 
upfront capital investment and its operation costs are low, it is placed in the beginning of the merit 
order curve and has priority access under the current European power network which relies on 
zonal pricing to handle congestion. Due to the uncertainty of wind generation, excess wind power 
might lead to grid congestion. Furthermore, the installed wind power plants are usually located in 
places without sufficient consumption. Therefore, the utilization of wind energy often requires long 
distance transportation, which creates an extra burden for the network and may exacerbate 
congestion. The impact of wind energy on network congestion has been observed in the German 
electricity network, in which huge amount of power is transported from the northern part, where 
the main installations of wind turbines are located, to the southern and mid-western parts where 
the demand is high (Deutscher Bundestag, 2010).  
Power grids are connected within European countries, therefore the effect of wind power is not 
limited by national border. The use of zonal pricing (uniform pricing) for congestion management 
in most of the European countries has made this problem difficult to solve. Zonal prices are 
achieved regardless of network capacity and physical laws constraints within their domestic 
markets, and international commercial power exchange between two countries is limited by a pre-
planned Net Transfer Capacity (NTC) value. Therefore, the scheduled commercial power exchange 
is not necessarily equal to the real (physical) power exchange. In windy days, due to the effect of 
loop flow, countries that are close to wind farms might greatly suffer from unscheduled power 
exchange. For example, the Polish and Czech network operators claimed that unscheduled cross-
border flows from wind generation in Germany overloaded their transmission networks more 
frequently, making their grids less stable and secure (Kunz 2012). 
In order to limit the large number of loop flows caused by wind/solar generation from Germany, 
Poland uses a very low Net Transfer Capacity (NTC) to reduce the power exchange with Germany. 
However, a low NTC can only restrict physical power exchange by restricting commercial trading 
between two connected countries. It cannot prevent the wind-generated power from entering the 
network because information regarding the location of the power generation and the network 
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constraint is not used. Figure 1 below shows the unplanned power flows, which are the differences 
between the day-ahead scheduled commercial flows and the physical power flows between the 
50Hertz area (Germany) and the PSE area (Poland) for the period between January and April 2014. 
The large magnitudes of unplanned flows indicate that a lower NTC did not help Poland to 
eliminate the loop flow caused by the wind-generated power from Germany. 1  
 
Source: 50Hertz (2014) 
Figure 1: Unplanned power flows between the 50Hertz area (Germany) and the PSE area (Poland)              
In constrast to zonal pricing, nodal pricing gives the value of power for each location by including 
all the physical and technical constraints (Schweppe et al. 1988). Nodal pricing limits the needs for 
re-dispatching and reduces the corresponding cost. Furthermore, it gives the correct incentives for 
future investments by reflecting the value of scarce transmission capacity (Hogan 1992). 
Leuthold et al. (2008) have shown that the nodal pricing scheme is economically superior to the 
zonal pricing scheme for the integration of wind and solar power into the German grid.  However, 
Leuthold et al. (2008) do not exam how intercountry power exchange affects the application of 
nodal pricing. This question is crucial because Europe has launched a Price Coupling of Regions 
                                                 
1 Both the day-ahead market solution, which does not take the network constraints into account, and the re-dispatching 
procedure (i.e., changes on load/generation) could lead to unscheduled power flows. 
unplanned power flow 50hertz<->PSE[MW]  
MW 
Date 
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(PCR) project in order to enhance power exchange among different countries and create a single 
European day-ahead market (EIRGRID 2013). This project now involves power exchanges 
including APX/Belpex, EPEX SPOT, GME, Nord Pool Spot, OMIE, and OTE (NordPool 2014), 
which accounts for more than 75% of European electricity demand. Therefore, applying nodal 
pricing in a single European country should not ignore the loop flow effect from the other countries. 
Bjørndal et al. (2014) investigate a pricing model for an electricity market with a hybrid congestion 
management method, i.e. part of the system applies the nodal pricing scheme and the rest applies 
the zonal pricing scheme, and test the model in a 13-node power system. The model determines 
prices and net transfers for all the involved regions using a joint calculation. Their results indicate 
that part of the network is better utilized by applying nodal pricing in such a hybrid context. 
However, nodal pricing fails to function fully as it is supposed to due to the influence of the zonal 
pricing areas. They find that wrong price signals are given at nodes (within the nodal pricing area) 
connected to the zonal pricing area, which might trigger more unplanned power flow. 
Poland had planned to implement nodal pricing within its domestic market in 2015 (Sikorski 2011) 
but the project has been abandoned. In the long run, nodal pricing has been questioned within the 
European market. One of the main concerns is that nodal pricing might impede market 
harmonization as it imposes more restrictions (e.g., network capacity constraints) than zonal 
pricing, and thus could limit power exchange. However, applying zonal pricing might also reduce 
international power trades, and even to a larger extent. Sensfuss et al. (2008) argue that the merit-
order effect would decrease the day-ahead market prices in Germany as more wind mills are 
installed and thus Germany would reduce its power import. 
In our study, we apply the hybrid scheme proposed by Bjørndal et al. (2014) for a joint power 
market for Poland, Germany, Czech, and Slovakia. We assume that Poland applies nodal pricing 
and that the rest of the countries apply zonal pricing. The Polish network is inter-connected with 
other continental countries, and even if Poland applies nodal pricing, it is still inevitable that the 
network will be affected by the flows from zonal pricing areas. In our study, we compare the hybrid 
pricing scheme to the full nodal pricing scheme (i.e., all the four countries apply nodal pricing) and 
the full zonal pricing scheme (i.e., all the four countries apply zonal pricing). We find that the 
hybrid pricing helps to provide price signals by identifying the power resource scarcity within the 
  
  5 
 
Polish market, and that this results in increased international power exchange between Poland and 
the rest of the countries. 
An interesting research question raised by our study is to test whether hybrid pricing can help 
Poland in integrating its neighboring wind-generated power into the grid when the Polish nodal-
pricing market is surrounded by zonal-pricing countries. We investigate a Business-as-Usual (BAU) 
scenario and a High-Wind-Level (HIGH WIND) scenario for comparison. Specifically, we study 
the following questions: First, does hybrid pricing perform as well in the HIGH WIND scenario as 
it does in the BAU scenario in terms of giving correct pricing signals? Second, what is the impact 
of wind penetration on day-ahead market prices and cross-border power exchange when hybrid 
pricing is applied? Third, does hybrid pricing affect the physical power exchange? 
2. Model 
The target model for the European day-ahead power market is to simultaneously determine 
volumes and prices in all relevant zones based on the marginal pricing principle (ACER, 2013).  In 
this paper, we apply the hybrid pricing model in a joint day-ahead market, in which there are two 
different pricing schemes, i.e., zonal pricing and nodal pricing. Different areas are not isolated from 
each other and commercial trading is considered regardless of the pricing schemes. This implies 
that both the day-ahead volumes and later re-dispatch in the zonal pricing areas will affect the nodal 
pricing areas. 
Assumptions regarding the day-ahead market clearing and re-dispatching are briefly illustrated in 
Figure 2. We have a step-wise supply bidding curve which assumes that all the generators bid at 
their marginal cost. Wind/solar-generated power is placed at the beginning of the supply curve, 
with very low marginal cost. The system is to maximize social welfare and the day-ahead market 
clearing price (P*) and quantity (Q*) are determined by the interaction of the supply and demand 
bidding curves. Due to the network constraints not taken into account in the day-ahead market, 
some of the contracted power cannot be dispatched and therefore re-dispatching is needed. In the 
re-dispatching model, we assume that power plants that fail to dispatch the contracted power would 
pay their saved marginal cost to the market and power plants that increase their generation in order 
to satisfy the demand would be compensated by their short-run marginal cost of production (i.e., 
no economic profit is accruing from the re-dispatching procedure, neither for generation or load.). 
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Increased generation which replaces the non-dispatchable contracted power is more expensive and 
leads to an extra cost, which is shown as the yellow area in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2: Market clearing procedure and re-dispatching (without load/supply shedding) 
The complete mathematical formulation of the model is given below: 
Set 
ܿ ∈ C   Set Conventional power plants 
C௡   Set of conventional power plants located at node n 
C௭   Set of conventional power plants located in zone z 
݊, ݊݊ ∈ ܰ   Set of all nodes  
ܱܰܦܣܮ   Set of nodes in the nodal pricing area 
ܼܱܰܣܮ  Set of nodes in the zonal pricing area 
ܪܻܤܴܫܦ Set of nodes that are in the nodal pricing area and connected to the zonal 
pricing area 
݈ ∈ ܮ   Set of all transmission lines 
݈ ∈ ܮ_ܱܰܦܣܮ Set of transmission lines within the nodal pricing area 
Gerneration Surplus 
Redispatching Cost 
Day-ahead Market 
Equilibrium
Price 
Quantity 
P* 
Q* 
Customer Surplus 
Supply Curve 
Demand Curve 
Wind/solar power Non-dispatchable contracted power 
Substitutive power 
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ݖ, ݖݖ ∈ ܼ  Set of all zones 
Parameters 
ܽ௡   Intercept of the demand function at node ݊ 
ܾݒ݁ܿݐ݋ݎ௡,௡௡  Series susceptance of line ݊, ݊݊ [1/Ω] 
ܾ݅݃ܯ   Curtailment cost [EUR/MWh] 
ܿ݃௖   The electricity generation cost for power plant c [EUR/MWh]2 
݃݀ܽ௖   Contracted generation of plant c in the day-ahead market [MW] 
݃݉ܽݔ௖  Maximum generation of plant c [MW] 
݃ݏ݋݈ܽݎ௡  Solar generation at node ݊ [MW] 
݃ݓ݅݊݀௡  Wind generation at node ݊ [MW] 
݉௡   Slope of the demand function at node ݊ 
݊ݐܿ௭,௭௭   Net transfer capacity between zone ݖ and ݖݖ [MW] 
݌݉ܽݔ௡,௡௡  Thermal transmission limit of transmission line ݈ [MW] 
ݍ݀ܽ௡   Contracted demand at node n in the day-ahead market [MW] 
Variables 
∆௡   Voltage angle at node ݊ [rad] 
ܩ௖,௡   Generation of plant c locating at node ݊ [MW] 
ܩܦ ௖ܰ   Decreased generation of plant c locating at node ݊ [MW] 
ܩܷ ௖ܲ   Increased generation of plant c locating at node ݊ [MW] 
ܮܨ௡,௡௡   Power flow between nodes ݊ and ݊݊ [MW] 
ܮܱܣܦܵܪܧܦ௡  Load curtailments at node ݊ [MW] 
ܰܫ௡   Net input at node ݊ [MW] 
                                                 
2 The electricity generation cost is composed of two parts (i.e., fuels cost and carbon cost). 
  
  8 
 
݌௡   Price at node ݊ 
ܳ௡   Demand at node ݊ [MW] 
ܱܵܮܵܪܧܦ௡  Solar power curtailments at node ݊ [MW] 
ܶܨ௡,௡௡   Commercial trading between nodes ݊ and ݊݊ [MW] 
ܹܫܰܦܵܪܧܦ௡  Wind power curtailments at node ݊ [MW] 
Details of the nodal pricing and zonal pricing schemes are based on the ELMOD framework 
described in Leuthold, Weigt and von Hirschhausen (2012). The full explanation of the model is 
given below. 
2.1 Day-ahead market model 
maxொ,ீ ∑ ሺܽ௡ ∗ ܳ௡ ൅ 0.5 ∗௡ ݉௡ ∗ ܳ௡ଶሻ െ ∑ ܿ݃௖ ∗ ܩ௖௖       (1)3 
Subject to: 
ܰܫ௡ ൌ ∑ ܩ௖, ൅ ݃ݓ݅݊݀௡ ൅ ݃ݏ݋݈ܽݎ௡ െ ܳ௡, ∀݊ ∈ ܱܰܦܣܮ௖∈஼೙     (2.a) 
∑ ൫ܶܨ௡,௡௡ െ ܶܨ௡௡,௡൯௡௡ ൌ ∑ ܩ௖ ൅ ݃ݓ݅݊݀௡ ൅ ݃ݏ݋݈ܽݎ௡ െ ܳ௡,௖∈஼೙ ∀݊ ∈ ܼܱܰܣܮ  (2.b) 
ܰܫ௡ ൅ ∑ ൫ܶܨ௡,௡௡ െ ܶܨ௡௡,௡൯௡௡ ൌ ∑ ܩ௖ ൅ ݃ݓ݅݊݀௡ ൅ ݃ݏ݋݈ܽݎ௡ െ ܳ௡௖∈஼೙ , ∀݊ ∈ ܪܻܤܴܫܦ (2.c) 
ܩ௖ ൑ ݃݉ܽݔ௖           (3) 
ܮܨ௡,௡௡ ൌ ܾݒ݁ܿݐ݋ݎ௡,௡௡	ሺ∆௡ െ ∆௡௡ሻ, ሺ݊, ݊݊ሻ ∈ ܮ_ܱܰܦܣܮ, ∀݊, ݊݊ ∈ ܱܰܦܣܮ   (4)	 
ܰܫ௡ ൌ ∑ ܮܨ௡,௡௡௡௡:ሺ௡,௡௡ሻ∈௅_ேை஽஺௅ െ ∑ ܮܨ௡௡,௡௡௡:ሺ௡௡,௡ሻ∈௅_ேை஽஺௅ ; ∀݊ ∈ ܱܰܦܣܮ  (5) 
െ݌݉ܽݔ௡,௡௡ ൑ ܮܨ௡,௡௡ ൑ ݌݉ܽݔ௡,௡௡, ሺ݊, ݊݊ሻ ∈ ܮ_ܱܰܦܣܮ, ∀݊, ݊݊ ∈ ܱܰܦܣܮ  (6) 
∆௡ᇲൌ 0, ݊ᇱ ൌ ݏ݈ܾܽܿ݇ݑݏ	݅݊	ݐ݄݁	݊݋݈݀ܽ	݌ݎ݅ܿ݅݊݃	ܽݎ݁ܽ     (7) 
                                                 
3 The model assumes a linear inverse electricity demand function of the form: ݌௡ሺܳ௡ሻ ൌ ܽ௡ ൅݉௡ ∙ ܳ௡ at each node ݊ of the network. In the Appendix I, it is shown how to determine the prohibitive price and slope by using reference 
price and demand. The model maximizes the total social welfare, which is defined as
   
0 0
 
n cQ G
n n n n c c
n c
p Q dQ cg G dG   .  Inserting the linear inverse demand function into the social welfare function, 
the expression becomes
  2
0 0
 2
n cQ G
n
n n n n c c n n n c c
n c n c
ma m Q dQ cg dG a Q Q cg G
            

     . 
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∑ ∑ ܶܨ௡,௡௡ ൑ ݊ݐܿ௭,௭௭, ∀݊ ∈ ܼܱܰܣܮ ∪ ܪܻܤܴܫܦ,௡௡∈௭௭௡∈௭ ∀ݖ, ݖݖ ∈ ܼ, ݖ ് ݖݖ   (8) 
ܩ௖ ൒ 0, ܳ௡ ൒ 0, ܶܨ௡,௡௡ ൒ 0         (9) 
The objective of the day-ahead market model is to maximize social welfare Eq. (1), considering 
the network constraints. The model distinguishes between nodal pricing and zonal pricing areas. 
2.1.1 Nodal pricing area 
The areas applying nodal pricing is constrained by energy balance (Eq. (2.a)), maximum generation 
capacity of thermal power plants (Eq. (3)), and restrictions on power transmission (Eq. (4)-(6)). 
Energy balance (Eq. (2.a)) ensures that at node ݊, net input or withdrawal ܰܫ௡  is equal to the 
difference between power generation (including all the conventional power generation ܩ௖ at node 
n, wind generation ݃ݓ݅݊݀௡, and solar generation ݃ݏ݋݈ܽݎ௡) and nodal demand ܳ௡. Conventional 
power generation is restricted by the maximum generation requirement gmaxୡ  (Eq. (3)). The 
Direct Current approximation (DC) approach (see Chao et al. (2000) and Sauma and Oren (2006)) 
is used to determine the load flows ܮܨ௡,௡௡  (Eq. (4)) in each line and the resulting injection or 
withdrawal ܰܫ௡ (Eq. (5)) at each node in the nodal pricing area. Eq. (6) limits the absolute physical 
exchange between system nodes and Eq. (7) is to specify the slack bus. 
2.1.2 Zonal pricing areas 
In the areas applying zonal pricing, we assume free trading within the domestic markets regardless 
of the physical laws and network capacity constraints. Therefore, trading within zonal pricing area 
are only constrained by energy balance (Eq. (2.b)) and capacity restrictions of power plants (Eq. 
(3)). The commercial flows between two nodes ܶܨ௡,௡௡ introduced in Eq. (2.b) will never go from 
a higher price area to a lower price area.4 
2.1.3 Interfaces  
The nodes that are within a nodal pricing area but connected with a zonal pricing area(s) are 
constrained by both types of pricing schemes (Eq. (2.c)). We assume that the power exchange 
                                                 
4 The variable	ܮܨ௡,௡௡ is positive if the physical power flow goes from defined starting point of line ݈ and is negative 
otherwise. ܶܨ௡,௡௡ is defined as commercial flow between two points and is enforced to be no less than 0. Commercial 
flow will not go from a higher price to a lower price area. That is ܶܨ௡,௡௡ ൌ 0	݂݅	݌௡ ൐ ݌௡,௡௡. The physical flow ܮܨ௡,௡௡ 
however, could go from a higher price area to a lower price area due to the effect of loop flow in the nodal pricing 
model.  
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between such nodes and the zonal pricing area is commercial trading. That is, the flow between a 
nodal pricing area and a zonal pricing area is not modeled taking physical laws into account.  
Commercial transfers between two connected pricing areas are limited by Net Transfer Capacity
,z zzntc  (NTC) (Eq. (8)), which is set by the Transmission System Operator (TSO) before the 
clearing of the day-ahead market.5 We assume that commercial trading is limited not only between 
two connected zonal pricing areas but also between a nodal pricing area and its connected zonal 
pricing areas. NTC values have two directions (i.e., one for importing and one for exporting power 
from/to one or several country (countries)). In the full zonal pricing scheme, between two countries, 
only one direction of NTC values will be used and power exchange happens only from a lower 
price area to a higher price area. However, in the hybrid pricing scheme, power exchange could 
happen in both directions between a nodal pricing zone and a zonal pricing zone as the prices in 
the nodal pricing area are not uniform. 
2.2 Re-dispatching model 
Because the zonal pricing areas consider only restrictions on inter-zonal transfers, a separate re-
dispatching model has to be specified to manage physical congestion within the zones. However, 
the nodal pricing area is inevitably affected by the zonal pricing area due to the impact of the loop 
flow laws. Thus, re-dispatching could be needed in the nodal pricing area as well. The uncertainties 
regarding the supply (e.g., both wind and solar are available at this specific hour) and demand are 
not modeled in this paper and re-dispatching occurs only due to the physical network constraints 
that are not taken into account in the day-ahead market. 
We assume that the re-dispatching model takes a pay-as-bid approach. Power plants increasing 
their generation are compensated by their short-run marginal cost of production; power plants 
decreasing their generation pay their saved marginal costs. However, in practice, the TSOs may 
not always find the cheapest available power and thus an even higher re-dispatching cost could 
                                                 
5  Two approaches could be found to formulate the NTC constraints in the full zonal pricing scheme, i.e., the gross 
approach which sets the gross commercial flows in each direction to be no larger than the pre-defined NTC value (e.g., 
CASC.EU (2014), Kunz (2012)) and the net approach which sets the net commercial flows in each direction to be no 
larger than the NTC value (e.g., Bjørndal et al. (2014)). When it comes to formulate the NTC constraints between a 
nodal pricing area and a zonal pricing area, these two approaches might give different results. The gross approach is 
stricter than the net approach. The gross approach allows that both directions of the NTC constraints are binding at the 
same time. 
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occur. We further assume that the TSOs can only access the re-dispatching resource within their 
own area.6 
Below the formulation of the model is given: 
݉݅݊ሾ∑ ሺܿ݃௖ ∗ ܩܷ ௖ܲ െ௖ ܿ݃௖ ∗ ܩܦ ௖ܰሻ ൅ ∑ ܾ݅݃ܯ ∗ ሺܹܫܰܦܵܪܧܦ௡ ൅ ܱܵܮܵܪܧܦ௡ ൅௡
ܮܱܣܦܵܪܧܦ௡ሻሿ          (10) 
Subject to: 
ܰܫ௡ ൌ ∑ ሺ݃݀ܽ௖ ൅ ܩܷ ௖ܲ െ ܩܦ ௖ܰሻ ൅ ሺ݃ݓ݅݊݀௡ െܹܫܰܦܵܪܧܦ௡ሻ ൅ ሺ݃ݏ݋݈ܽݎ௡ െ௖∈஼೙
ܱܵܮܵܪܧܦ௡ሻ െ ሺݍ݀ܽ௡ െ ܮܱܣܦܵܪܧܦ௡ሻ, ∀݊ ∈ ܰ      (11) 
0 ൑ ݃݀ܽ௖ ൅ ܩܷ ௖ܲ െ ܩܦ ௖ܰ ൑ ݃݉ܽݔ௖, ∀ܿ       (12) 
ܮܨ௡,௡௡ ൌ ܤ௡,௡௡	ሺ∆௡ െ ∆௡௡ሻ, ሺ݊, ݊݊ሻ ∈ ݈, ∀݊, ݊݊      (13) 
ܰܫ௡ ൌ ∑ ܮܨ௡,௡௡௡௡:ሺ௡,௡௡ሻ∈௅ െ ∑ ܮܨ௡௡,௡௡௡:ሺ௡௡,௡ሻ∈௅ , ∀݊ ∈ ܰ     (14) 
െ݌݉ܽݔ௡,௡௡ ൑ ܮܨ௡,௡௡ ൑ ݌݉ܽݔ௡,௡௡, ሺ݊, ݊݊ሻ ∈ ܮ, ∀݊, ݊݊     (15) 
∆௡ᇲൌ 0, ݊ᇱ ൌ ݏ݈ܾܽܿ݇ݑݏ	         (16) 
∑ ሺܩܷ ௖ܲ െ ܩܦ ௖ܰሻ௖∈஼೥ ൌ 0, ∀ݖ ∈ ܼ         (17) 
ܩܷ ௖ܲ ൒ 0, ܩܦ ௖ܰ ൒ 0, ∀ܿ         (18) 
The objective of the re-dispatching model is to minimize total re-dispatching costs (Eq. (10)). The 
generation from the hybrid model can be increased by cGUP  or decreased by cGDN . To ensure 
the feasibility of the re-dispatching model, the model allows options to curtail nodal (consumer’s) 
load (	ܮܱܣܦܵܪܧܦ௡) and to reduce solar (ܱܵܮܵܪܧܦ௡) and wind generation (ܹܫܰܦܵܪܧܦ௡). 
However, the marginal costs of these options are assumed to be significantly higher (ܾ݅݃ܯ ≫ 0ሻ 
than any other marginal generation cost. 
The dispatching from the day-ahead model is treated as input in the re-dispatching model, which 
implies that both the demand Q୬ and the generation Gୡ are now given and represented in the model 
by the parameters qda୬ and gdaୡ respectively. The energy balance constraint (Eq. (11)) and the 
generation capacity constraint (Eq. (12)) have to be taken into account. Again, the DC 
                                                 
6  See Oggioni and Smeers (2013), which discuss different degrees of coordination among the TSOs in the re-
dispatching models. 
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approximation approach is used to reflect the physical flow in the network (Eq. (13) – (16)). We 
assume that the system operators are fully aware of operations by other system operators in the re-
dispatching model. However, re-dispatching is restricted within the same pricing area. That is, the 
system operators can only increase or decrease generation within their own jurisdiction. Decreased 
generation should be equal to increased generation within the same pricing area (Eq. (17)). 
The day-ahead market model is a quadratic problem and the re-dispatching model is linear. Models 
are coded in GAMS. The time frame is 1 hour. For simplification, the unit commitment decisions 
and block bids are not taken into account. 
3. Power System and Data 
 
Source: ENTSO-E  
Figure 3: Map of Grid and the German Wind Power Plants Distribution 
3.1 Network 
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We apply the models in the previous section for a hypothetical joint market for Germany, Poland, 
Slovakia, and Czech Republic. The network topology together with the AC lines’ physical 
characterization is derived from Kunz (2012)7, by choosing the nodes and lines relevant to the 
countries under consideration (i.e., Germany, Poland, Slovakia and Czech Republic). 
Interconnections of these countries with the rest of the European countries are not taken into 
account. In total, 529 buses, 835 lines, and 411 power plants are used for this analysis. The 
transmission network for these countries is displayed in Figure 3. The capacity of transmission 
lines is de-rated to 80% of their nominal capacity to approximate N-1 security constraints in the 
network (Leuthold, Weigt, & von Hirschhausen, 2012). 
3.2 Market data 
In order to get more realistic results, we have collected data (e.g., reference load, price, and NTCs) 
given by the involved day-ahead markets. As congestion most likely happens in the hours with 
high demand, we define a high load hour (i.e., 1.2 times the average hourly load in 2012) for the 
analysis. Therefore, we arbitrarily choose a specific hourly load (i.e., 9 a.m. in 2012-03-01) which 
is approximately equal to 1.2 times the average hourly load in 2012 and use the corresponding day-
ahead market prices as the reference prices. 
From TO EXPORT NTC 
IMPORT 
NTC 
DE CZ 1400 1800 
PL CZ-DE-SK 1700 200 
PL SK 600 500 
SK CZ 1200 1800 
CZ PL 600 400 
  Sources: ENTSO-E 
Table 1: NTC values (in MW) 8 
Net Transfer Capacities (NTCs)9 , which indicate the maximum commercial power exchange 
volumes, are used to limit the physical power exchange between two connected zones. For instance, 
a great amount of wind power generated in North Germany is transported to South Germany using 
                                                 
7 The original dataset is based on 2008 market data and has been updated to 2011 market data. 
8 Instead of publishing a separate NTC value for each country, the Polish transmission system operator defines a 
common NTC for all polish cross-border exchange, including the borders with Germany (DE), Czech Republic (CZ) 
and Slovakia (SK) altogether.   
9Data regarding NTCs are obtained from the ENTSO-E portal. 
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the Polish transmission network. In order to restrict the German wind-generated power running 
through the Polish transmission system, the Polish TSO publishes very low NTCs for the Germany-
Poland cross-border commercial exchange. However, the NTCs may fail to limit physical power 
exchange, especially when wind blows. This is because countries applying the zonal pricing 
scheme disregard the internal network restrictions and physical laws in their areas. Before the 
contracted power is dispatched, the location of the power is unknown (i.e., could be anywhere 
within a zone). Therefore, Poland could fail to stop the German wind power from getting into its 
transmission system, which could make its power network less secure especially during peak hours. 
3.3 Definition of scenarios 
The wind and solar installations (Table 2) are assumed to be at the 2011 installation levels (Source: 
EWEA 2013, EPIA 2013). Germany accounts for more than 90% of the wind/solar installations in 
the four countries. Wind power locations are concentrated to a few specific areas and causes large 
amounts of loop flow in our study case. We specifically estimate how the power system would be 
affected by the increased wind power by defining two different scenarios, the Business-as-Usual 
(BAU) scenario and the High-Wind-Level (HIGH WIND) scenario, according to wind power 
penetration level. We assume that the availability of wind power is 21% of the total installation 
capacity in the BAU scenario and a higher wind level, 50% of the total installation capacity is 
assigned to the HIGH WIND scenario.10,11 We keep availability of solar power to be 9% of total 
installation capacity in both scenarios. 
Country Wind Solar 
CZ 217 1959 
DE 29071 24807 
SK 3 508 
PL 1616 3 
Table 2: Wind and Solar installations (in MW) 
4. Results  
In this part, we first clarify some concepts in order to conduct further analysis.    
                                                 
10 The mean capacity factor for wind power (the ratio of average delivered power to theoretical maximum power) 
during the period 2003-2008 for Europe is close to 21% (Boccard 2009). 
11 The HIGH WIND scenario shows the impact of adding more wind generation into the grid. We assume a higher 
wind availability in our analyses, however, as an alternative we could have expanded existing wind capacity.  
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1. ݌௡ 
Market price (݌௡): The dual variable of Eq. (2), i.e., the marginal cost/benefit of increasing 
one unit of power at node ݅, defines the price at node ݅. Price within each zonal pricing area 
is uniform as there are no restrictions on intra-zonal trading. Prices within the nodal pricing 
area can be different as the model takes both the physical laws and thermal capacity limits 
into account. 
 
2. ܦܥ ൌ ∑ ݌௡ܳ௡௡               (19) 
Demand cost (DC): Defined as the sum of the product of nodal demand ܳ௡ and nodal or 
zonal spot price. 
3. 	ܩܫ ൌ ∑ ൣ݌௡ ∑ ݃݀ܽ௖௖∈஼೙ ൧௡ ൅ ∑ ሾܿ݃௖ܩܷ ௖ܲሿ௖ െ ∑ ሾܿ݃௖ܩܦ ௖ܰሿ௖          (20) 
Generation incomes (ܩܫ): Defined as income earned in the day-ahead market plus incomes 
from re-dispatching if up-regulation is required (minus costs caused by re-dispatching if 
down-regulation is required).  
4. ܩܥ ൌ ∑ ሾܿ݃௖ሺ݃݀ܽ௖ ൅ ܩܷ ௖ܲ െ ܩܦ ௖ܰሻሿ௖            (21) 
Generation cost (ܩܥ): Refers to the costs of the final generation dispatching given the re-
dispatching results.  
5. ܩܵ ൌ ܩܫ െ ܩܥ              (22) 
Generation surplus (ܩܵ): Defined as generation income (GI) minus generation cost (GC). 
The generation surplus does not increase after re-dispatching as we assume that the 
generators will only be compensated by their marginal cost.  
6. ܴܥ ൌ ∑ ሾܿ݃௖ܩܷ ௖ܲሿ௖ െ ∑ ሾܿ݃௖ܩܦ ௖ܰሿ௖            (23) 
Re-dispatching cost (RC) is the cost caused by re-dispatching.  
7. ܥܴ ൌ ∑ ݌௡ܳ௡ െ ∑ ݌௡ ∑ ݃݀ܽ௖௖∈஼೙ ൌ ଵଶ௡௡ ∑ ∑ ሺ݌௡௡ െ ݌௡ሻ ൈ ܶܨ௡௡,௡ ൅௡௡௡ ∑ ∑ ሺ݌௡௡ െ௡௡௡
݌௡ሻ ൈ ܮܨ௡,௡௡ሻ               (24) 
Congestion rent (CR) collected from the day-ahead market can generally be described as 
the difference between day-ahead market payment received from consumers and day-ahead 
market payment to generators. 12 
                                                 
12 Also referred to merchandizing surplus (MS) (Wu et. al 1996). 
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In a full zonal pricing regime, congestion rent for the transmission system operator only 
results from allocation of international net transfer capacity (i.e.,	ܶܨ௡௡,௡) during the day-
ahead market clearing. That is, because day-ahead price is uniform, no congestion rent will 
be collected within each area (country) applying zonal pricing. In contrast, within countries 
applying nodal pricing, congestion rent results not only from international trading but also 
from the differences in locational marginal prices. 
We assume that the rent from cross-border commercial trading is equally shared by the two 
system operators. 
4.1 Day-ahead market prices 
Table 3 presents the day-ahead market prices (without re-dispatching cost) for the four countries 
in the two scenarios under different schemes. Prices are consumption volume weighted. In the BAU 
scenario, the full zonal solution shows that Poland has the lowest price among these four countries, 
mainly due to the low marginal generation costs of its coal and gas-fired generation. Therefore, 
Poland does not import power from the other three countries. In the hybrid pricing model, the 
average price within Poland increases after taking into consideration the physical constraints. 
Therefore, the power in the other three countries becomes comparatively cheaper (without 
considering re-dispatching cost). Poland in this case imports power from other countries. 
 BAU HIGH WIND 
Pricing Scheme Zonal Hybrid Nodal Zonal Hybrid Nodal 
Czech Republic 50.89 50.30 48.13 48.25 48.08 49.34 
Germany 50.89 51.03 52.67 48.25 48.08 49.15 
Poland 49.76 52.49 52.11 48.88 50.45 49.95 
Slovakia 50.89 50.30 48.51 48.25 48.08 48.43 
* Nodal prices where applicable are consumption volume weighted 
Table 3: Day-ahead prices (in € per MWh) 
In the HIGH WIND scenario, market prices given by all the three pricing schemes generally 
decease given the input of low-cost wind power. The full zonal pricing scheme gives similar prices 
for all the four countries (prices for Czech, Germany and Slovakia are identical), of which Poland 
has the highest price mainly because it restricts power exchange with other countries by setting a 
lower NTC value. In the hybrid pricing scheme, Poland again has the highest price mainly due to 
the consideration of network constraints. (The prices for the other three countries are lower without 
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counting the re-dispatching cost.) Moreover, the uniform pricing in the zonal-pricing areas makes 
it more difficult for Poland to identify low-cost power. For instance, power in North Germany 
should have been cheaper on a windy day and Poland could have imported the power, which does 
not happen due to the uniform pricing in Germany. 
 BAU HIGH WIND 
Pricing Scheme Zonal Hybrid Zonal Hybrid 
Czech Republic 51.01 50.25 48.29 48.09 
Germany 51.54 51.71 48.60 48.43 
Poland 50.98 49.72 49.66 48.79 
Slovakia 50.81 50.24 48.24 48.08 
Table 4: Unit prices with re-dispatching cost and congestion rent (in € per MWh) 
Compared to zonal pricing, hybrid pricing helps Poland reduce its cost for re-dispatching and 
collect a great amount of congestion rent. (This is discussed in Section 4.3 and 4.4 of the article.) 
Consumers in Poland could potentially benefit from this improvement. Table 4 gives the unit prices 
for both the zonal and hybrid pricing schemes after taking into consideration the re-dispatching 
cost and congestion rent (i.e., the prices include re-dispatching cost but deduct congestion rent). In 
both the BAU and HIGH WIND scenarios, the hybrid pricing solution reduces the unit prices for 
Poland. 
 
Figure 4: Day-ahead Price comparisons in Poland 
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We further assess the hybrid model by evaluating whether the prices in Poland could truly reflect 
the network congestion. We compare the prices in Poland given by the hybrid pricing scheme to 
those given by full nodal pricing scheme in Figure 4. We use t-tests to identify any statistically 
meaningful difference between the hybrid prices and the full nodal prices in both scenarios. 13 
In both the BAU and HIGH WIND scenarios, the hybrid prices fluctuate but generally match with 
the full nodal prices, indicating that hybrid prices in such a context are able to capture the 
congestion signals within the network. However, in both scenarios, the average hybrid prices are 
significantly higher than the average nodal prices.14 This indicates that hybrid pricing cannot fully 
utilize all the available resource in the network. The major reason is that the lack of price signals 
in the zonal pricing areas (i.e., uniform prices within Germany, Czech Republic, and Slovakia) 
prevents Poland from trading optimally both with respect to location and prices. For example, in 
the full nodal pricing solution of the BAU scenarios, prices in the southern part of Poland are lower 
than those in the northern part. This induces Polish export to the Czech Republic, which is further 
exported to serve the great demand for power in Southern Germany. In contrast, in the hybrid 
system, uniform prices are given for the inter-connected countries (i.e., Germany, Czech Republic, 
and Slovakia) and thus no price signals are received by Poland. As a result, compared to full nodal 
pricing, Poland exports more power to Germany and Slovakia but less power to Czech Republic 
(as shown in Figure 5). This increases the prices at nodes connected with Germany and Slovakia 
(as displayed in Table 3) within Poland. Because no transparent price signals are revealed within 
the Czech market, Poland does not export its power from the best inter-connected nodes indicated 
by full nodal pricing. Therefore, some inter-connected nodes experience higher prices (i.e., 
exporting more power) while others have lower prices (i.e., exporting less power) compared to the 
full nodal pricing solution. 
Furthermore, the trading cap (i.e., NTC value) in the hybrid pricing scheme further restricts some 
optimal trades suggested in the full nodal pricing scheme. This is especially important in the HIGH 
WIND scenario, in which the input of wind power greatly reduces the prices in the full nodal 
scheme. The low NTC value restricts Poland from importing cheap power from Germany, leading 
to an even higher price differences compared to nodal pricing. 
                                                 
13 A t-test is any statistical hypothesis test in which the test statistic follows a Student's t distribution if the null hypothesis is supported. It can be used to determine if two sets of data 
are significantly different from each other. 
14 The actual average hybrid prices should be even higher if re-dispatching cost is considered. 
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Hybrid prices are more variant in the BAU scenario than in the HIGH-WIND scenario. This is 
shown by the higher standard deviation of the price differences in Table 5, which means that the 
hybrid prices and nodal prices differ to a larger extent in the BAU scenario than in the HIGH-
WIND scenario (i.e., the absolute value of the differences is higher). In the BAU scenario, Poland 
has more commercial trading with other countries and therefore is more likely to be affected by the 
zonal pricing area. In the HIGH-WIND scenario, Poland greatly limits its import from other 
countries and becomes a relatively more independent system, thus getting less affected by the zonal 
pricing area. This indicates that more frequent interactions with other zonal pricing areas will 
enlarge the price differences (in absolute value) between hybrid prices and nodal prices. 
 BAU SCENERIO HIGH WIND SCENERIO
Mean (Price differences) 0.36 € 0.47 € 
Observed Number (Node) 113 113 
Standard Deviation(Price differences) 1.98 1.09 
T-statistic 1.94 4.58 
Table 5: Price matches for nodal pricing and hybrid pricing in Poland 
4.2 Power exchange 
Figure 5 gives the commercial cross-border trading volumes in both the BAU and HIGH WIND 
scenarios for different pricing schemes. 15,16 We find that international exchange would reduce in 
the HIGH WIND scenario; however, the hybrid pricing scheme has more international exchange 
than the full zonal pricing does. International power exchange is reduced in the HIGH WIND 
scenario because Germany, as the main importing country in the BAU scenario, produces wind 
power that satisfies its own load demand. Another reason leading to the low international power 
exchange is that Germany’s uniform pricing system does not allow other countries to identify the 
cheap wind power. Therefore, countries, such as Poland, are not able to import as much power as 
indicated by the solution of the full nodal pricing scheme. For example, in the full nodal pricing 
scheme, Germany exports 623MW to Poland. In comparison, Germany exports 100 MW to Poland 
in the full zonal pricing scheme, and exports 200 MW to Poland in the hybrid pricing scheme. The 
zonal-pricing areas (e.g., Germany) therefore could hold their cheap energy in their own countries 
                                                 
15 Commercial flows given by the full nodal pricing solution are the same as the physical flows.  
16 Solutions regarding the commercial trading among areas with identical price may not be unique. Congestion rent 
between such areas is always 0.  
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before they have transactions with the inter-connected countries, leading to a reduction in 
international power exchange. Besides, this indicates that Germany is using the Polish network to 
transport its power without paying corresponding congestion rent. (This is further discussed in the 
next section 4.3.) 
We further find that the power exchange for Poland under hybrid pricing is affected by the zonal 
pricing areas. In the BAU scenario under the hybrid pricing scheme, Poland exports most of its 
available commercial trading amount and also imports 200MW from Germany to help relieve its 
grid congestion.17 This is because price signals indicate more congestion in the northern part of 
Poland and it would cost less for Poland to import than to produce the power. However, in the full 
nodal pricing, Poland does not import power from other countries in the day-ahead market. 
Under the HIGH WIND scenario, great amount of wind generated power brings down the price in 
Germany, greatly reduces its power import, and creates an uncongested power market for Germany, 
Czech Republic, and Slovakia (i.e., identical market price for these three countries) in both the 
hybrid pricing scheme. The market prices for these three countries do not provide transparent 
signals for Poland. As a result, the interface node (nodes) in Poland with the least cost (i.e., lowest 
market price) trades with the zonal-pricing areas. In our case, power is traded in the Polish-German 
border. However, physical power exchange given by the full nodal pricing solution model indicate 
that no power flows should go directly from Poland to Germany. Flows should have first gone to 
Czech and finally enter the German jurisdiction. 
4.3 Re-dispatching and unplanned physical flows 
The physical power flow between two nodes follows the least loss path. As we assume no 
uncertainty regarding generation supply or load demand, power flows are feasible and re-
dispatching is not needed in the full nodal pricing scheme. However, day-ahead markets that apply 
zonal pricing or hybrid pricing produce commercial power flows, which are not necessarily equal 
to actual physical power flows and might need re-dispatching in order to relieve grid congestion. 
Table 6 and Table 7 give both the commercial power flows and physical power flows for the two 
scenarios. Physical power flows without re-dispatching are calculated based on the day-ahead 
                                                 
17 Poland has several nodes connecting with one country. As the prices vary within the Polish network, Poland could 
import power at some of the connected nodes while export power at other nodes. 
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market solution.18 Physical power flows might not be feasible. To ensure feasible power flow, re-
dispatching is needed. 
 
 
Figure 5: Cross-border commercial trades (in MW) 
                                                 
18  To calculate the physical power flows of the zonal and hybrid pricing solution, we fix the values of nodal load and generation. We use these values as inputs for a detailed network 
model to re-compute the final line flows. This network model takes loop flow into consideration, and minimizes the losses caused by dispatching, but does not consider thermal 
capacity constraints. Thus we obtain the power flows that will result from injections and withdrawals in the nodes given by the zonal and hybrid pricing solutions (Bjørndal et al. 
2012). 
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In the BAU scenario, Poland, as the main exporting country, is only to a limited extent influenced 
by flows from other countries. Under both full zonal and hybrid pricing, the net physical power 
exchange between Poland and its neighboring countries is close to the net commercial power 
exchange: power flow is rearranged on the border. 
Commercial Exchange 
(Day-ahead market) 
Physical Power Exchange 
(without re-dispatching) 
Physical Power Exchange 
(with re-dispatching) 
Zonal pricing Zonal pricing Zonal pricing 
      To 
From CZ DE PL SK SUM 
      To
From CZ DE PL SK SUM
      To
From CZ DE PL SK SUM
CZ - 1752 0 387 2139 CZ - 2271 0 639 2910 CZ - 2269 0 592 2861
DE 0 - 0 0 0 DE 0 - 0 0 0 DE 0 - 0 0 0 
PL 361 795 - 544 1700 PL 1022 275 - 403 1700 PL 966 278 - 456 1700
SK 0 0 0 - 0 SK 110   - 110 SK 117 0 0 0 117 
SUM 361 2547 0 931 3839 SUM 1132 2547 0 1041 4720 SUM 1083 2547 0 1048 4678
Hybrid Pricing Hybrid Pricing Hybrid Pricing 
      To 
From CZ DE PL SK SUM 
      To
From CZ DE PL SK SUM
      To
From CZ DE PL SK SUM
CZ - 1800 0 355 2155 CZ - 2026 0 595 2621 CZ - 2147 0 603 2750
DE 0 - 200 0 200 DE 0 - 0 0 0 DE 0 - 50 0 50 
PL 400 627 - 600 1627 PL 784 201 - 442 1427 PL 895 131 - 451 1478
SK 0 0 0 - 0 SK 81 0 0 - 81 SK 100 0 0 - 100
SUM 400 2427 200 955 3983 SUM 865 2227 0 1036 4129 SUM 995 2278 50 1055 4378
Table 6: Cross-border Power flows in the BAU scenario (in MW) 
In the HIGH WIND scenario, Poland in total imports 200 MW power from other countries in the 
day-ahead market given the full zonal pricing solution. However, the physical power flows entering 
the Polish network given by the day-ahead market and re-dispatching models are 1122 MW (922 
MW of unplanned power flows) and 1342 MW (1142 MW of unplanned power flows) respectively. 
Thus, a low NTC in the zonal pricing solution does not prevent power flows from entering the 
Polish network. This large number of unplanned power flows indicates that other countries have 
utilized the Polish network to transport power, which might threaten the Polish network security. 
By applying the hybrid pricing model, Poland still imports in total 200 MW in the day-ahead market. 
However, Poland is able to export power and thus reduces the unplanned import power flows. 
Specifically, instead of importing from all the other three countries under full zonal pricing, hybrid 
pricing suggests that Poland should only import power from Germany (to relieve its grid congestion 
in the northern part) and export power in its southern part. Ideally, Poland should have exported 
power to Czech and Slovakia as the nodal pricing model indicates. Although Poland exports power 
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to Germany instead, this could still to a large degree prevents the Polish network from being 
occupied by the German wind power. As a result, the physical power flows entering the Polish 
network given by the day-ahead market and re-dispatching models are reduced to 730 MW (530 
MW unplanned power flow) and 863 MW (663 MW unplanned power flow). That is, applying 
hybrid pricing could help Poland to reduce unplanned power flow entering its network by around 
35%. 
 
Table 7: Cross-border Power flows in the HIGH WIND scenario (in MW) 
Table 8 summarizes the re-dispatching cost given by the full zonal pricing and hybrid pricing 
schemes. As expected, Poland could greatly reduce its re-dispatching cost in the hybrid pricing 
model. Compared to the full zonal pricing scheme, re-dispatching costs for Poland have been 
reduced by 93% in the BAU scenario and 88% in the HIGH WIND scenario when Poland uses 
nodal pricing.  
 
 
 
Cross-border Exchange  
(Day-ahead market) 
Physical Power Exchange  
(without re-dispatching) 
Physical Power Exchange  
(with re-dispatching)              
Zonal pricing Zonal pricing Zonal pricing 
      To 
From CZ DE PL SK SUM 
      To
From CZ DE PL SK SUM
      To
From CZ DE PL SK SUM
CZ - 253 68 1380 1700 CZ - 1586 19 1189 2795 CZ - 1837 0 894 2730
DE 0 - 100 0 100 DE 331 - 1103 0 1434 DE 342 - 1342 0 1684
PL 0 0 - 0 0 PL 763 0 - 158 922 PL 688 0 - 454 1142
SK 0 0 32 - 32 SK 0 0 0 - 0 SK 0 0 0 - 0 
SUM 0 253 200 1380 1832 SUM 1094 1586 1122 1348 5150 SUM 1030 1837 1342 1348 5557
Hybrid Pricing Hybrid Pricing Hybrid Pricing 
      To 
From CZ DE PL SK SUM 
      To
From CZ DE PL SK SUM
      To
From CZ DE PL SK SUM
CZ - 344 0 1350 1694 CZ - 1680 20 905 2605 CZ - 1848 0 885 2733
DE 0 - 200 0 200 DE 333 - 710 0 1043 DE 348 - 863 0 1211
PL 0 493 - 0 493 PL 578 0 - 446 1023 PL 690 0 - 466 1156
SK 0 0 0 - 0 SK 0 0 0 - 0 SK 0 0 0 - 0 
SUM 0 837 200 1350 2388 SUM 911 1680 730 1350 4671 SUM 1039 1848 863 1350 5100
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 BAU HIGH WIND 
 ZONAL PRICING 
HYBRID 
PRICING 
ZONAL 
PRICING 
HYBRID 
PRICING 
CZ 1220 646 448 374 
DE 43481 46609 24209 23537 
PL 24346 1624 15061 1732 
SK 0 0 0 0 
SUM 69047 48879 39718 25642 
Table 8: Re-dispatching Cost 
4.4 Congestion rent 
Changes in cross-border trades lead to the reassignment of congestion rent. In the full zonal pricing 
scheme, prices are uniform within each zone and therefore congestion rent is only collected for 
cross-border trades. In the hybrid pricing scheme, Poland could also collect congestion rent within 
its domestic market. Table 9 summarizes congestion rent for cross-border trades. We assume that 
the congestion rent resulting from cross-border commercial trading is equally shared by the two 
system operators. Table 10 gives the congestion rent collected by each country for their inter-zonal 
and intra-zonal trade. 
In the full zonal pricing solution under the BAU scenario, price differences only exist between 
Poland and the other countries. Therefore, congestion rent is collected only in the Polish border. In 
the hybrid pricing solution, more congestion rent could be collected as more power has been 
transferred among the countries. In the hybrid pricing model, Poland exports less power to 
Germany, which increases the price in Germany and creates price differences between Germany 
and other countries. Because of this, Poland collects less cross-border congestion rent while the 
other countries collect more. However, Poland would collect a great amount of congestion rent 
within the domestic market when applying nodal pricing.  
In the HIGH WIND scenario, because more power is traded in the hybrid pricing scheme, more 
congestion rent is collected than in the full zonal pricing solution. However, the total international 
congestion rent is greatly reduced compared to the BAU scenarios. Less international power 
exchange is the main contributor of the reduction in congestion rent. Prices outside the Polish 
network are the same in both the zonal pricing and hybrid pricing solutions. Therefore, congestion 
rent could only be collected in the Polish border. 
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BAU HIGH WIND 
Zonal pricing Zonal pricing 
          To 
From CZ DE PL SK
           To 
From    CZ    DE    PL    SK
CZ - 0 0 0 CZ - 0 43 0 
DE 0 - 0 0 DE 0 - 64 0 
PL 411 905 - 620 PL 0 0 - 0 
SK 0 0 0 - SK 0 0 20 - 
Hybrid Pricing Hybrid Pricing 
          To 
From CZ DE PL SK 
            To
From CZ DE PL SK 
CZ - 1314 0 0 CZ - 0 0 0 
DE 0 - 284 0 DE 0 - 346 0 
PL 737 0 - 430 PL 0 0 - 0 
SK 0 0 0 - SK 0 0 0 - 
Table 9: Cross-border congestion rent (in €) 
BAU HIGH WIND 
 ZONAL PRICING 
HYBRID 
PRICING  
ZONAL 
PRICING 
HYBRID 
PRICING 
 Inter-zonal 
Intra-
zonal 
Inter-
zonal 
Intra-
zonal  
Inter-
zonal 
Intra-
zonal 
Inter-
zonal 
Intra-
zonal 
CZ 205 × 1025 × CZ 22 × 0 × 
DE 452 × 799 × DE 32 × 173 × 
PL 968 × 725 53062 PL 64 × 173 33123 
SK 310 × 215 × SK 10 × 0 × 
Note: Revenues from cross-border commercial trading are equally shared by the two system operators 
Table 10: Congestion rent collected by each country (in €) 
4.5 Supply and demand adjustment 
The re-dispatching models allow the options to curtail the nodal load, solar and wind generation in 
order to ensure a feasible solution.19 There is no need for curtailment of solar and wind generation 
for any of the studied cases (i.e., Table 11). Load curtailments happen in all the studied cases. 
Hybrid pricing yields a lower load curtailment than zonal pricing does. In the full zonal pricing 
schemes, Germany and Poland are the only two countries (i.e., Table 12) that face load shedding. 
Poland does not need to curtail its load in the hybrid pricing scheme. 
                                                 
19 The load, wind and solar shedding costs are assumed to be 500 €/MWh (higher than any other marginal cost of electricity production). 
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 BAU HIGH WIND 
 ZONAL PRICING 
HYBRID 
PRICING 
ZONAL 
PRICING 
HYBRID 
PRICING 
Load Shedding 107.92 28.71 82.62 14.75 
Solar Curtailment × × × × 
Wind Curtailment × × × × 
Table 11: Curtailment for different pricing schemes (in MW) 
 BAU HIGH WIND 
 ZONAL PRICING 
HYBRID 
PRICING 
ZONAL 
PRICING 
HYBRID 
PRICING 
CZ × × × × 
DE YES YES YES YES 
PL YES × YES × 
SK × × × × 
Table 12: Load shedding countries 
5. Conclusion 
This paper attempts to investigate how efficiently the hybrid pricing scheme works in a coupled 
European power market as more wind-generated power enters the grid. This paper applies a pricing 
model with two types of congestion management methods. Four countries Czech Republic, 
Germany, Poland, and Slovakia are involved in the research, of which Poland applies nodal pricing. 
We construct two different wind levels (i.e., BAU and HIGH WIND) to test how nodal pricing 
performs in different perspectives. 
We find that countries that are greatly affected by neighboring wind-generated power, such as 
Poland, would benefit from applying nodal pricing to address its network congestion. In the HIGH 
WIND scenario, international power exchange has been greatly reduced in the full zonal pricing as 
wind-generated power satisfies a significant portion of the demand within German market. 
However, the real (physical) power exchange does not accordingly reduce due to the physical 
characteristics of power transmission. Therefore, a large amount of unscheduled power flow enters 
the Polish power grid. Though transparent price signals are missing in Polish neighbor countries, 
nodal pricing helps Poland to identify resource scarcity within its domestic market. Poland has 
more demand in its northern part while cheaper resources in its southern part. Therefore, Poland 
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could import power in its northern part but export power in its southern part in the nodal pricing 
scheme. This helps Poland to reduce the unplanned power flows from Germany. 
We also find that using nodal pricing, Poland would reduce its need for re-dispatching and collect 
a great amount of congestion rent. The Polish consumers might benefit from applying the nodal 
pricing scheme. Taking the re-dispatching cost and congestion rent into account, the average unit 
price given by the hybrid pricing solution decreases compared to the zonal pricing solution. We 
also find that nodal pricing would reduce the need for load curtailment. 
Another interesting result is that in countries with a great amount of wind-generated power, such 
as Germany, they will benefit from keeping zonal pricing. In such a way, Germany would be able 
to keep the low-cost energy within their countries. Furthermore, they could transmit the power 
using their neighboring grid without paying corresponding congestion rent. 
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Appendix 
Determination of prohibitive price and slope using reference price and demand 
The model assumes a linear inverse electricity demand function of the form:  
݌௡ሺܳ௡ሻ ൌ ܽ௡ ൅݉௡ ∗ ܳ௡  
Demand function: ܳ௡ሺ݌௡ሻ ൌ െ ௔೙௠೙ ൅
ଵ
௠೙ ∗ ݌௡  
Definition of elasticity: ߝ ൌ డொ೙డ௣೙ ∗
௣೙
ொ೙  (The elasticity is assumed to be -0.25 in the model.) 
ߝ ൌ ଵ௠೙ ∗
௣೙
ொ೙  
Determination of prohibitive price and slope using reference price and demand: 
 ݉௡ ൌ ௣
ೝ೐೑
ௗೝ೐೑ ∗
ଵ
ఌ ,	ܽ௡ ൌ ݌௥௘௙ െ ݉௡ ∗ ܳ௡௥௘௙ 
 
 load (MW) Ref. Price (Euro) 
CZ 8636 57.01 
DE 64421 62.01 
PL 19499 48.68 
SK 3692 57.01 
 
Table AI :Electricity load and reference prices for the four countries on 13.02.201320 
                                                 
20 Hourly day-ahead prices for Germany are available from the European Power Exchange Spot. For Poland the day-
ahead price is calculated from as the quantity-weighted mean value of three auction prices provided by the Polish 
Power Exchange. 
